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1. Introduction
In an important historical contribution, Maddison (2001) stressed that 
productivity growth jumps in the aftermath of the first industrial revolution 
and that its accelerating pace continues, even though this astonishing growth 
has not been uniform worldwide. In addition, several empirical works1 have 
shown that income per capita differences have increased dramatically over 
the last fifty years, highlighting a trend for richer countries to converge to-
ward parallel growth paths. Evidence of this income polarization process 
has been well documented by Quah (1993; 1997) and Durlauf (1996) who 
reported that the time evolution of cross-country income is converging to-
ward a two-peaked distribution. Although it is incontestable that the rate of 
factors accumulation is important in explaining the development process of 
capitalist economies, economists stress that physical and human capital accu-
mulation do not completely account for both cross-country productivity level 
and income per capita disparities2. As Easterly - Lavine (2001) point out:
...when comparing growth experiences across many countries, «something else» – be-
sides factor accumulation – plays a prominent role in explaining differences in eco-
nomic performance. [...] ... this «something else» accounts for the majority of the 
cross country differences in both the level of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per 
capita and the growth rate of GDP.
Thus, there is an additional source of divergence for disparities in pro-
ductivity and income per capita, and many economists seem to recognize 
1 For a review of this huge literature see in particular Caselli (2005).
2 In particular, see Prescott (1998).
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knowledge differences as the main factor in this worldwide economic per-
formance divergence. But knowledge cannot easily be bought like an ordi-
nary commodity, so the ability of each developing country to acquire and 
then to absorb know-how depends on the development of local capacity and 
on the development and efficiency of appropriate institutions. Consequently, 
knowledge is a key production input and each factor regarding its acquisi-
tion cost has the effect of shifting the bargaining power toward producers 
of knowledge and away from users. All these considerations have policy im-
plications and raise the question of what is the best way of stimulating both 
innovation activities and technology transfer3.
During the 90s, there was a heated debate about how a knowledge-based 
firm’s intangible assets could be protected in order to avoid both misappro-
priations and intellectual theft. One example of such a debate is the Uruguay 
Round of GATT, whose Final Act created the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty rights (TRIPS) with the aim of providing new and more effective tran-
snational institutions capable of managing the transition toward a globalized 
economy.
However, since technology is mostly in private hands, tight regulations, 
such as TRIPS, may deter rather than enhance technology transfer. Indeed, 
there is undeniable evidence5 that developing countries suffer significantly 
from lagging labour productivity and managerial efficiency, related in part 
to the failure to adopt the latest technology or to update their labour force. 
This determines the extent to which these countries can assimilate and apply 
foreign technology and to favour technology transfer from abroad. In Eu-
rope and the US, for instance, a democratic intellectual property (IP) rights 
protection system has been crucial in ensuring that returns to individual in-
vestments in creativity accrue to society as a whole. However, IP rights have 
always been assessed in a broader policy context including trade and anti-
trust policies, as well as more general industrial policies (see Braga - Fink 
- Sepulveda, 1999; Maskus, 2000; and Khan, 2002).
In light of that, do international institutions, in particular WTO and 
WIPO, provide adequate advice and analysis for understanding the particu-
lar needs of developing countries and poor people? In their bilateral relations 
with developing countries, do developed countries take sufficient account 
of the needs of developing countries and, in particular, of poor people in 
them? And moreover, are developing countries themselves sufficiently aware 
3 For theoretical studies on innovation and technology transfer see, among others, Help-
man, 1993; Lai, 1998; and Glass - Saggi (1998; 2002).
 With TRIPS, every WTO member has strengthened the global protection offered to 
suppliers of technology, defining what rights an inventor is entitled to and what institutions 
should be available to punish any infringing behaviour.
5 See in particular Baumol - Blackman - Wolff (1992); and Trefler (1995).
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of where their own interests lie and do they have the capacity to secure those 
interests in bilateral and multilateral negotiations?
In this paper we will illustrate some possible strategies that policy-makers 
can develop in order to reduce their knowledge disadvantage, acquire tech-
nological knowledge from abroad, and solve all the problems connected with 
knowledge acquisition. The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we 
start describing what the economic literature refers to as knowledge, define 
what a knowledge gap is, and discuss which policies are more likely to re-
duce it. In sections 3,  and 5, we treat the question of technology transfer 
in greater depth and discuss the policies concerning knowledge acquisition, 
knowledge absorption, and knowledge implementation. Finally, section 6 con-
cludes.
2. Knowledge as a Production Input
It is common practice among growth theorists to consider technological 
knowledge as the main ingredient of sustained economic development. Al-
though technology is often highlighted and emphasized as a source of eco-
nomic disparities, there is no agreement in the profession about the way 
knowledge affects cross-country economic performances. Indeed, beside the 
common view that technological knowledge could be thought of as a quasi-
publicgood able to generate technological spillover affecting a country’s total 
factor productivity (TFP)6, there is an alternative view that looks at technol-
ogy as a common pool of knowledge available to firms and individuals in all 
countries7.
The first approach is based on the belief that technological knowledge is 
non-rival, partially excludable and can be accumulated without bound. When 
technological change improves the stock of knowledge, the discoverer of a 
new method or good needs some form of protection that safeguards the dis-
covery from any possible attempt to copy or imitate it, and that gives the in-
ventor the right to exclude other persons from the use of his ideas for com-
mercial purposes. However, this characteristic of excludability is only partial 
and becomes the source of technological spillover that allows the same peo-
ple to use ideas in different ways at the same time. In Romer’s (1990) words:
...treating knowledge as a non-rival good makes it possible to talk sensibly about 
knowledge spillover, that is, incomplete excludability. [...] The example of non rival 
input [...] is a design for a new good. The vast majority of designs results from the 
6 The seminal paper on this approach is Romer (1990). For further extensions and de-
velopments of such an approach see Grossman - Helpman (1991); Aghion - Howitt (1992, 
1998); Barro - Sala-i-Martin (1995, ch.7 and 8).
7 On this approach see Parente - Prescott (199, 1999); and Acemoglu (1998) for the ex-
tension of this approach to the case of skill-biased technological progress.
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research and development activities of private, profit-maximizing firms. A design is, 
nonetheless, non-rival. Once the design is created, it can be used as often as desired, 
in as many productive activities as desired.
In contrast, the alternative view looks at technology as worldwide com-
mon knowledge available to all countries, though access to it differs from 
country to country due to specifically domestic barriers to adopting leading-
edge technology. More specifically, Parente - Prescott (199, 1999) state that 
the actual cross-country divergence in income per capita is the consequence 
of policy differences among countries that, in turn, are the outcome of dif-
ferent political economy equilibria. Differences in TFP are linked to several 
social-political variables that make each country’s cost of adopting leading-
edge technology differ in time and space. In particular, Parente - Prescott 
(199) say
...these barriers take different forms such as regulatory and legal constraints, bri-
bes that must be paid, violence or threat of violence, outright sabotage, and worker 
strikes. Whatever their form, each has the effect of increasing the cost of technology 
adoption.
According to this approach, the diverse growth experiences of countries 
like South Korea and Philippines can be explained by a sort of unmeas-
ured technology adoption investment and by an increase in trade openness 
that worked in the direction of weakening the social-political impediments 
to technology adoption8, which indicated that there is a high correlation be-
tween cross-country differences in per capita income and TFP.
Although conceptually different, both approaches share an important 
feature: the presence of an institutional mechanism that prevents knowledge 
from flowing freely among people. In particular, the relationship between 
knowledge gap and knowledge transmission problems raises the question of 
how international institutions and developing country governments can act 
best in order to improve people’s life and to stimulate growth.9 However, it 
is not easy to narrow the knowledge gap. Developing countries are pursuing 
a moving target as the knowledge frontier is constantly being pushed forward 
by advanced countries.
In order to reach the knowledge frontier, developing countries have the 
option of acquiring and adapting the knowledge already available or repro-
8 For the sake of exposition, it is important to bear in mind that this approach has been 
criticized by several empirical papers. See, among others, the works of Hall - Jones (1999); 
Easterly - Lavine (2001).
9 The question of the measurement of cross countries knowledge gap is one of most de-
bated issues in the applied economic literature. This is mainly due to the lack of detailed in-
dicators of technological capabilities as well as to the lack of data for a large number of de-
veloping countries. For a more detailed discussion, see in particular Archibugi - Coco (200, 
2005).
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ducing/copying existing knowledge. This means policy makers have to take 
three critical steps in order to move closer to the technological frontier:
Knowledge acquisition, which involves tapping and adapting existing 
knowledge as well as creating knowledge locally through R&D;
Knowledgeabsorption, which concerns the creation of an efficient educa-
tional system able to ensure universal basic education, opportunities for life-
long learning, and the support of tertiary education;
Knowledge implementation, which involves the creation of institutions 
capable of taking advantage of the latest information about technological 
knowledge and making it available to every individual in society.
Although it is quite easy to distinguish three steps conceptually and discuss 
each of them separately, there exists a sort of complementarity in acquiring, ab-
sorbing, and implementing knowledge that makes it hard to separate a step from 
the other, and government strategies to narrow the knowledge gap are more ef-
fective when they exploit such synergies. This implies that the temporary advan-
tage of one country in certain lines of production can no longer be seen statically 
in terms of unchanging tangible factors; rather, once knowledge is taken into ac-
count, dynamic comparative advantage is what matters for long run growth and 
prosperity. The pursuit of a dynamic comparative advantage then suggests that 
developing countries should remain importers rather than producers of techni-
cal knowledge for some time, in such a way as to create the potential to improve 
their knowledge. Obviously, the speed with which they do this will vary accord-
ing to the country, depending on its capacities, incentives and policy strategies.
3. The Knowledge Acquisition Policies
In order to promote the acquisition of knowledge from abroad, a devel-
oping country’s policy makers have to take into account the fact that tech-
nology moves from one country to another thanks to direct learning about 
foreign technological knowledge (DL), the use of the leading-edge technol-
ogy embodied in the more recent generation of intermediate products (IIP), 
and processes of reverse engineering activity (RE).
DL stems from the fact that each technological improvement is based on 
a new blueprint which increases the international cumulative stock of codi-
fied information on new ideas and production processes. This new informa-
tion spills over from the country where it was initially created into others 
even in the absence of international trade, allowing the foreign blueprint to 
increase the international stock of knowledge (see Howitt, 2000). Instead, 
when one considers IIP as source of technology diffusion, it is worthwhile to 
think of it as a sort of passive spillover, in the sense that employing foreign 
intermediate goods involve an indirect access to the results of foreign R&D. 
Strictly related with IIP is the concept of RE, which refers to those activities 
where importer countries copy the technology embodied in the intermediate 
products just by reverse-engineering it.
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Many economists have stressed that developing countries can acquire 
technology by opening-up their economies to knowledge from abroad and/or 
by creating knowledge not already available elsewhere. In that light, there are 
three possible ways of approaching the technological frontier, by opening up 
the economy either to international trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), 
and incentive technology licensing. In the next subsections we will discuss 
the role policy-making institutions may play in the transmission of knowledge 
through each of these channels
3.1. TradeasaChannelofTechnologyTransmission
Whenever transportation costs and tariffs are low compared to the cost 
of FDI and licensing, trade can be thought of as a way to acquire knowl-
edge. But is trade really useful to a developing country’s policy makers for 
generating technological inflow?
Even if many theorists state that trade flows into developing countries 
enhance technology transfer, things are far from being clear on the empiri-
cal ground. In two hotly debated papers, Coe - Helpman (1995) and Coe 
- Helpman - Hoffmaister (1997) investigate the linkage between trade and 
technology transmission inside OECD countries and between industrial 
countries and developing ones, showing that significant R&D spillover are 
not confined to the group of industrial economies but are also important for 
less developed economies. This study provides a quantitative estimate of the 
effect of the acquisition of information through international trade on 77 de-
veloping countries’ TFP. In doing so, they introduce the concept of «foreign
R&D capital stock» as the weighted average of the domestic R&D capital 
stock of the industrial countries with which the developing countries trade 
using bilateral import share as weights. They also find that the elasticity of 
TFP with respect to foreign R&D capital stock and import share are positive 
and significant and therefore conclude that international R&D spillover are 
related to the composition of imports: the more a developing country’s trade 
is biased toward industrial countries with a large cumulative experience in 
R&D, the higher its productivity.
Although these results are confirmed by Braga - Fink (1997) and Braga 
- Fink - Sepulveda (1999), Keller (1998; 2000) vehemently criticized these 
outcomes, finding similar high coefficients and similar predictions when 
a random instead of the actual import share is used. Extending the Mon-
tecarlo analysis to a two and three digit industry-data level, Keller (1998) 
finds that countries benefit more from domestic R&D than from the R&D 
of the average foreign country, and that the import composition of a coun-
try might matter for technology diffusion depending on how strongly biased 
it is towards (or away from) a country that is a technology leader, implying 
that Coe and Helpman’s claim that import composition is strongly related 
to technology diffusion cannot be upheld. In their response to Keller’s cri-
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tiques, Coe - Hoffmaister (1999) show that Keller’s random shares of import 
were not random because the probability distribution (of the import shares) 
concentrates around the inverse of the number of trading partners making 
the variance across different simulations rather small; they also demonstrate 
that there exist three alternative sets of random weights in which regression 
results lead to the conclusion that randomly created trade patterns could ex-
plain productivity growth.
In order to extend such a result to a micro-level analysis, Keller (1997) 
uses industry-data on international transaction in such a way as to reduce the 
loss of information from the use of aggregate data and to integrate the more 
recent theoretical works on open-economy relations with the early works 
on the importance of the input-output transmission of technology10. Using 
data from 13 manufacturing industries of eight OECD countries over the 
period 1970-1991, he found that the benefit derived from foreign R&D in 
an industry is in the order of 50-95% of the productivity effect of domes-
tic R&D, confirming earlier findings that cumulative investment in research 
is positively related to the productivity level. In particular, he estimated an 
elasticity of TFP of between 7-17% for domestic-industry R&D, and of be-
tween 20-50% for foreign-industry R&D, showing that the impact of foreign 
research investment on rising productivity is higher than from domestic re-
search investment in other industries. Moreover, if the same analysis is made 
for more technology-intensive industry he finds that the gain of productiv-
ity from foreign research investment in the same industry is less than from 
domestic other-industry research investment. This outcome suggests that the 
less technology-intensive industries tend to be technology users to a larger 
extent, while high technology-intensive industries benefit to less from outside 
research investment. These lower intra-industry spillover could be the result 
of a different market structure since high technology-intensive industries tend 
to be monopolistically competitive.
But what are the necessary ingredients to enable developing countries’ 
policy makers to attract technology through trade? Trade liberalization is one 
of these, even though its concrete application cannot disregard other impor-
tant institutional aspects such the IP rights legislation and its enforcement. 
In a theoretical contribution, for instance, Qiu - Lai (2003) point out that, 
when IP rights protection is weak, tariff protection in innovation-intensive 
sectors in developing countries is more detrimental to world welfare than in 
developed countries.
10 See particularly Scherer (198); and Evenson - Westphal (1995).
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3.2. Know-howTransmissionthroughFDIandLicensingContracts
Whenever transportation costs and tariffs are binding, FDI and licens-
ing contract are likely to supplant trade as channels for technology trans-
mission. FDI offers considerable opportunities for improving efficiency and 
growth, particularly, wherever the domestic production frontier is far from 
the state-of-the-art owing to a lack of managerial and entrepreneurial skills. 
However, as Archibugi - Iammarino (1999) stress, the debate on where mul-
tinational enterprises (MNEs) do actually locate their research and innova-
tion activities has not reached definite results and the empirical evidence on 
the share of innovation generated outside the home country of the MNE is 
still controversial. Through FDI, MNEs can provide access to either tech-
nological knowledge or managerial assets, which provides both a direct spur 
to productivity and significant spillover benefits throughout the economy. Of 
course, a correct approach to the problem suggests that the importance of 
many institutional aspects (such as, for instance, the education system, the 
antitrust regulation and/or the strength of property rights protection) in en-
couraging FDI varies according to the sectors. For instance, investment in 
lower-technology industries such as textiles, distribution, or hotels, is prob-
ably more closely linked to some specific factor such as inputs cost and mar-
ket opportunity, whereas in the presence of complex technology and a highly 
differentiated product, firms are more likely to undertake FDI when local 
human capital is particularly abundant and cheap11.
According to the ownership-localization internalization (OLI) theory (see 
Dunning, 1981 and Markusen - Maskus, 2001), a firm has the incentive to 
become a MNE when it has an ownershipadvantage as well as a locationad-
vantage over indigenous firms. Obviously, the economic advantages must be 
such that they outweigh the disadvantages it faces in international manage-
ment, cultural barriers and the geographical difficulties of monitoring local 
operations.
The economic advantages can be divided into ownership advantage and 
location advantage. As regards the former, many MNEs are characterized 
by some ownership advantage that gives them market power and cost effi-
ciencies. Such advantages could be embodied in tangible assets – such as a 
property claim in facilities producing key natural resources – or in intangible 
assets – such as a trademark or a reputation for quality. The existence of in-
tangible assets is often strongly associated with technology development and 
tends to be important in industries with high R&D intensities, where intan-
gible knowledge-based assets specific to each firm are significant. Moreover, 
the fact that technological knowledge is a quasi-public good enables MNEs 
to enjoy economies of scope, in the sense that a MNE can produce its tech-
11 On this point see in particular Teece (1986); Davidson - McFetridge (198, 1985) and 
Parello (2007).
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nological knowledge elsewhere and use it in several different locations, thus 
spreading the investment cost of technology development across numerous 
facilities (see Markusen, 1995, on this point). Note that this argument is 
particularly important for horizontal FDI12, in which a subsidiary produces 
goods and services that are similar to those produced at home and firms base 
their strategies for penetrating markets on the economic value of their intan-
gible knowledge-based assets. In this situation, IP rights become particularly 
important in the fostering of FDI in industries in which the development of 
transferable knowledge is a key focus of strategies. The intangible nature of 
their ownership advantage means that firms operating in such industries are 
strongly encouraged to engage FDI wherever IP right regimes are particu-
larly rigid and wherever an adequate supply of high-skilled labour is present.
On the other hand, even given some ownership advantage, many MNEs’ 
decisions to invest in a certain country could depend on location advantages 
(market size, local demand pattern, lower wage costs in relation to labour 
productivity, and so forth). Transport costs and distance from markets can 
be considered to be the main factors which may induce many firms to sub-
stitute export with FDI. Notice that a location advantage matters for both 
vertical and horizontal FDI, but it turns out to be particular relevant for the 
former, especially when a subsidiary produces inputs or assembles compo-
nents and when the construction of a vertically integrated network is crucial 
for the development of MNEs13. Such forms of outsourcing or delocalization 
are typical of a rapid expansion of intrafirm trade between developed and 
developing countries and for a huge knowledge transmission between MNEs’ 
headquarter and subsidiaries.
So, when local human capital is abundant and cheap, production incen-
tives, investment regulations and/or competition rules are important compo-
nents of a general regulatory system to attract vertical FDI as well as to facil-
itate the setting-up of foreign R&D laboratories. On the contrary, whenever 
cost-reducing policies (such as infrastructure investments) are at the top of 
a government’s agenda, technological transfer is likely to occur through out-
sourcing rather than through horizontal FDI. However, as soon as wages rise 
sufficiently so that the economies lose their cost advantages in outsourcing, 
vertical FDI falls off and horizontal FDI displaces outsourcing by making 
developing countries attractive locations for producing high-quality differen-
tiated products (Markusen, 1995).
Obviously, policy makers must take into account that the positive impacts 
of inward FDI and technology transfer do not come without costs. The nega-
tive effects can be principally recognized in a trend toward wage inequality, 
12 On this topic, see the pioneering paper of Markusen (198), and the latter develop-
ments by Horstmann - Markusen (1987; 1992); Brainard (1993); and Markusen - Venables 
(1998; 2000).
13 For an analysis of this approach, see particularly Helpman (198, 1985); Helpman - 
Krugman (1985).
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and in a loss of market competition. If there are few links with other eco-
nomic sectors, FDI may operate with limited spillovers into the technology 
adopted and pay higher than average wages to their own workers without 
ensuring that these wage impacts and technological spillover spread to other 
parts of the economy. Such a situation is aggravated if MNEs engage in an 
abusive practice of their dominant market positions.
In the OLI framework, MNEs could decide to undertake FDI independ-
ently of ownership and location advantages. Indeed, whenever advantages of 
internal organization or particular human assets are strong, MNEs are more 
likely to decide to acquire a subsidiary rather to license an asset with an in-
dependent foreign firm.
If the costs of transferring technology through arm’s-length transactions 
are high, and such costs are closely linked to the firm’s human capital, man-
agement or corporate culture, firms can be expected to prefer the acquisition 
of a subsidiary rather than to undertake a licence-relationship with an inde-
pendent firm. Thus, technology licensing in complex products and processes 
is more likely to emerge wherever the human capital base of the country is 
not able to receive technological advances. That is the result of the fact that 
transfer costs also depend on the developing country’s aptitude to absorb 
technology efficiently, and how the phase of knowledge acquisition is care-
fully combined with knowledge absorption.
However, such a decision could also depend on the strength with which 
licensing contracts are enforced. Indeed, most of these decisions are related 
to the difficulties of developing a satisfactory and enforceable contract be-
tween independent firms as well as to the presence of asymmetric informa-
tion between licensors and licensees (Teese, 1986). For instance, there may 
be problems in adopting license contracts as a channel of technology trans-
mission in those industries where licensees try to shirk their marketing or 
distribution responsibilities, to degrade the products’ quality or to sign con-
tracts with competing firms, and show more interest in their products. These 
kinds of problems are particularly significant in those industries in which a 
firm’s knowledge-based asset is a reputation for high quality and where the 
supply of technologies and products to licensees is highly competitive. If this 
is the case, a strong enforcement of the regulations against infringing firms 
could help the policy maker to compensate for the existence of imperfect 
information and to reduce the cost of monitoring licensees’ behaviour, but 
alone it cannot guarantee that the policy-making institution will be able to 
protect the market from unfair behaviors. In this sense, the creation of in-
formation centres for domestic firms, where they can learn the ins and outs 
of foreign technology markets, could reduce their disadvantage in licensing 
negotiations and make licensing more effective in attracting technology.
The 80s and 90s saw an increasing number of national and international 
agreements between firms for the communal development of specific R&D 
activities (Hagedoorn - Schakenraad, 1993). These forms of collaboration for 
technological advances have promoted a variety of mechanisms for the divi-
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sion of costs and the exploitation of results. In a way, the necessity to reduce 
innovation costs has created new forms of industrial organization and new 
ownership structures that are expanding beyond the simple technological 
sphere (Mytelka, 1991; and Dodgson, 1993).
4. Absorbing Knowledge Policies
Once a country succeeds in acquiring knowledge from abroad, the next 
step is to absorb it in order to construct a base for the future creation of 
an indigenous knowledge-based production system. In doing so, the focus of 
policymaking institutions must move towards higher education and technical 
training rather than IP rights, since it has been proved that the latter have 
just a marginal effect in this field. More specifically, what is needed is the 
creation of a flexible labour force that can keep up with a constant flow of 
technological advances, access to abundant financial resources and sophisti-
cated human skill with the business acumen to proceed at the same pace as 
the more innovative countries. But, when they face the question of improving 
their national education systems, a developing country’s policy makers should 
pay attention to both the way they design education policies and implement 
them, since the provision of education creates three sets of stakeholders: 
citizens, educators and teachers, and the government itself. Together, these 
stakeholders must establish a system which ensures that private and public 
investment in education is well spent, as well as guaranteeing teachers and 
educators the professional autonomy necessary for excellence. Cross-country 
evidences have found public spending on education to be unrelated to long 
run economic performances, showing that it is the quality of spending, not 
the amount, that matters.
As each level of education plays a crucial role in the absorption of knowl-
edge, policy makers need to provide for all ages and start thinking of educa-
tion as a lifelong process. This means that the role played by education does 
not stop with basic education1 but continues throughout life, especially in 
tertiary education and on-the-job learning. Of particular importance are the 
tertiary education and the learning-by-doing activity, because the increased 
use of information-based technologies as a country moves ahead towards a 
knowledge-based society raises the demand for skills in diffusing, interpret-
ing and applying new knowledge. This is why, over the last three decades, 
many countries have made enormous strides in expanding school enrolment 
at all levels and in rendering education accessible to all members of society.
As public measures are the most effective, governments must deal with 
the question of the failures which characterize the education market, and the 
1 For basic education we mean primary and secondary education, even though many 
other authors include the preschool programs in this category.
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distributional problems which arise from public intervention on education. 
As regards the first, the market failure associated with education are mainly 
due to the existence of imperfect information about the quality of education, 
and to the existence of spillover benefits in acquiring education. Instead, the 
distributional problems concern the accessibility of education for all mem-
bers of society which, in turn, warrant higher wages for educated people15. 
Thus, policy can address these questions:
– empowering informed stakeholders;
– helping poor people to pay for education.
.1. EmpoweringInformedStakeholders: fromProvidingTrainingtoProviding
Information
For many international institutions (notably the World Bank) the ef-
ficiency of education systems is crucial in helping developing countries to 
expand their national attitude to absorb complex technology. To build an 
efficient education system, however, policy makers have to deal with some 
informational problems which cannot be solved easily. For instance, inade-
quate levels of Information and Communications Technology literacy is one 
of the major problems facing many African countries such as Ghana and Ni-
geria (Oduwole, 2005 and Amekuedee, 2005) as well as big countries such as 
China (Zhou, 2005) as they move into the 21st century.
Education quality is a continuing source of concern for all stakeholders, 
especially if no adequate assessment is available. Indeed, as with all knowl-
edge-based products, people also have a difficult time judging education 
quality so that there could be temptation to exploit people’s ignorance. For 
instance, when parents have to take decisions about the education of their 
children, they may be uninformed about the relative benefits of competing 
educational opportunities, or about the value of education altogether.
But the perception of educational quality varies among stakeholders and 
in space, therefore the decentralization of education would give more power 
to those with the most information about educational needs and could there-
fore be a viable measure to contrast information problems. Several forms 
of decentralization, such as decentralizing administration, increasing school 
autonomy and relying on a mix of private and public providers, can help 
governments in offering information about specific educational institutions. 
For instance, moving from a «top-down» to a «client-driven» model would 
help institutions to mitigate the problems of an information imbalance and 
15 Indeed, as empirical studies of labour markets in Ghana, Tanzania, South Africa and 
Pakistan point out (see World Bank, 1999), one of education’s powerful effects is on wages. 
It has been documented that such association between higher wages and basic schooling can 
be partly attributed to the knowledge learned at school, and partly to the fact that acquiring 
education signals a worker’s capacity and motivation for learning.
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limited accountability due to over centralization, and to move responsibili-
ties to smaller jurisdictional units. It would also help to improve the coor-
dination and enforcement of education standards, because local authorities 
are assumed to have an advantage in identifying cheaper, more appropriate 
ways of providing services to fit local preferences and in better monitoring 
the performance of providers.
But decentralization alone cannot solve all problems. For programs to be 
effective and suppliers to be held accountable, all stakeholders must be well-
informed in order to make decisions about a particular program of curricula. 
There may be high social payoffs from policies that improve the collection 
and dissemination of information about education and the opportunities 
open to more educated people. One way to match formal training programs 
with the evolving skill needs of employers is to move from direct provision 
to government intermediation between trainee and provider by means of a 
planning and coordinating activity16. This creates the incentive for develop-
ing countries to continuously update and upgrade their education-system, in 
order to ensure their labour force is able to adopt future advances in tech-
nology. For this reasons, government plays a prominent role in adapting and 
developing new curricula and programs and in promoting a variety of gov-
ernment-supported in-service training opportunities aimed at fostering and 
reinforcing global integration, especially in the continuously evolving fields 
of science and technology.
Moreover, an additional goal, in a sense complementary to the former, is 
to encourage the use of new technologies in the classroom, specially the new 
information-technology that can potentially increase access to education and 
reduce its unit cost. Increased access to computer-based teaching, especially 
after the rapid decline in the costs of hardware and software, can undoubt-
edly constitute a practical way of improving the quality of education. Such a 
quality improvement would be particularly significant for tertiary education, 
especially in the middle-income economies that have already experienced a 
rise in the secondary school graduation rate.
.2. PoorRelieftoPayforEducation
Education requires considerable private resources which often constrain 
a person’s decision to enrol in training or education even when no fees are 
required. When individuals have to decide whether to become a student or 
a trainee, not only the formal fees but also the additional costs of education 
play a prominent role in the evaluation of the opportunities that education 
16 For instance, in many countries governments are doing more to provide information 
about test score improvements and placement records for students in particular schooling 
and training programs. For a survey of national experiences see Middleton - Ziderman - Van 
Adams (1993).
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may open to people. The time an individual spends in taking classes or in a 
training program is time not spent on other more remunerative tasks, such as 
working for a wage or in a family enterprise.
For this reason, many surveys have shown that low income is the ma-
jor constraint on people’s willingness to undertake education17 and such a 
constraint turns out to be particularly binding wherever capital markets are 
far from being perfect18. If credit markets for human resource investments 
are imperfect, households may not be able to finance investments in educa-
tion, despite high expected rates of return19. In such circumstances a poor 
household will find it difficult to mobilize the requisite funds, regardless of 
how bright the prospects are. This underlies an information problem because 
lenders cannot properly assess either the returns on investing in human capi-
tal or the ability level of people before undertaking an educational program. 
Such a situation deprives society of a large pool of people who could benefit 
from learning and, worse still, exacerbates income inequality among different 
classes. Moreover, credit constraints might also adversely affect the composi-
tion of educational, especially where the educational sector is very competi-
tive20 and where the provision of education generates externalities. Wherever 
private enterprise is particularly present, private schools can specialize in ar-
eas where the demand is strong, thus neglecting areas where market compe-
tition makes education not profitable. This could create a lack of supply in 
particular areas without a specific occupational goal such as mathematics and 
natural sciences, and an oversupply of educated people in more popular ar-
eas such as business. This is not necessarily a bad outcome since it frees pub-
lic resources to offer education in areas where the externalities are greater.
The best solution to credit market failures is to relieve the credit con-
straint by means of student loan programs covering tuition, living expenses, 
or both. But even when the credit constraint is removed, there may still be 
under investment in education and it may have to be subsidized. Many de-
veloping countries subsidize both schooling and training, but often their ef-
forts are misplaced and biased, and many times they fail to provide subsidies 
17 See among others Psacharopoulos (199) and World Bank (1995).
18 On this issue, in the 90s a vast branch of economic literature studied the effect of ca-
pital market imperfection on growth and inequality without, however, emphasizing what hap-
pens to the rate of technology transfer. For the most important paper on the effect of capital 
market imperfection on growth and income inequality see among others Galor - Zeira (1993); 
Benabou (1996). For a rich survey on all the major studies see particularly Cozzi (1998).
19 In an empirical study, Psacharopoulos (199) estimated that the private rates of return 
on education in developed countries are more than 30 percent a year for primary schooling 
and about 20 percent a year for secondary and tertiary schooling.
20 For instance, the Philippines are a clear example of a competitive environment for 
education, where private universities provide 80 percent of tertiary education. The need to 
cover the operating costs force university to offer courses with a specific occupational goal, 
thus neglecting to offer education wherever there are high fixed costs for lab equipment. For 
details see James (1991).
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to all members of society21. The basic problem that arises when subsidies are 
active instruments of policy intervention, is that they are seldom targeted to 
those who deserve them or to the fields of study that warrant subsidization 
for efficiency and distributional reasons. Such subsidies must be redirected 
to those who, because of their talent or their choice of discipline, are likely 
to generate positive externalities.
5. Knowledge Implementation
Much of our dissertation so far has been focused on the ways to facilitate 
the flow of knowledge from those who have much of it to those who have 
less. But to be effective, technological knowledge must be communicated to 
final users in an efficient as possible way. This is essentially a problem of in-
formation disclosure, which can also be interpreted as a problem of creating 
the best national R&D incentive system. This question turns out to be par-
ticularly important for developing countries, where the use of new technol-
ogy is still limited and foreign competition is such to discourage the setup of 
a local, efficient R&D system.
According to Stern - Porter - Furman (2001) a national innovation sys-
tem22 can be defined as the capability of a country to produce and commer-
cialize a flow of innovative technology over the long-term. In this sense, they 
point out that the most relevant factors to national innovative capacity are: 
a) the existence of a common innovation structure (investments that support 
innovative activity and that operate across all the R&D-orientated industries 
of the economy), and b) the presence of a cluster-specific innovation envi-
ronment (investments that support the firm-specific innovative capacity that 
depends on the microeconomic environment).
It is worth pointing out that the matter of creating a national innovation 
system is substantially a matter of creating an all-encompassing institutional 
environment as well as an efficient incentive scheme able to promote R&D at 
minimum social cost. To accomplish such objectives, governments can pursue 
two different, though complementary, ways:
– Set up the most efficient incentive scheme to promote private R&D;
– Construct an efficient and autonomous publicR&Dsystem.
Each of these two issues will be treated in the following two subsections.
21 On this issue, see the empirical analysis of Albrecht - Ziderman (1991); and World 
Bank (1995).
22 On the concept of national innovation system see among others Nelson (1993).
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5.1. ProvidingtheBestIncentiveScheme
Following Arrow (1962), economists made a great effort to demonstrate 
that competitive markets are not able to direct innovation. Some form of 
incentive scheme is needed in order to warrant the existence of a domestic 
R&D environment. Over time, however, economists have proposed many dif-
ferent incentive mechanisms, so that the main argument that makes a govern-
ment prefer one scheme rather than another is often linked to the amount of 
information it has on the expected value of the R&D output as well as on 
the efficiency level of firms (Gallini - Scotchmer, 2003). In this section we fo-
cus on three of these mechanisms, notably: IPR design, Prizes and Procure-
ment contracts.
IPrights
When both the value and the cost of an invention are not observable 
without incurring cost, one way to solve this provision problem is to grant 
the producer of the invention a property right on it. IP rights protection has 
both merits and shortcomings. When the social value of the invention is not 
observable, IP rights can be justified as a screening mechanism to encourage 
investment in high-value/high cost projects. Indeed, since firms have this in-
formation advantage over government, they will use their private information 
to screen investment projects, otherwise the market would punish them by 
acting as a self-discipline device for surviving.
The second big merit is that IP rights can be seen as an efficient mecha-
nism for increasing the rate at which firms invest in R&D as well as generat-
ing technological knowledge. As the value of the patent value increases with 
the value of the innovation, the existence of a well enforced patent system 
gives the patent-holder the economic incentive to spend more resources to 
create inventions of greater value.
As regards shortcomings, IP rights have the great defect of generat-
ing deadweight loss due to monopoly pricing. Optimal resource allocation 
requires that all goods be sold at marginal cost, which in the case of new 
knowledge is assumed to be practically zero. Optimization thus demands that 
new knowledge be made available at marginal cost or for free to all those 
who can use it. Moreover, it is assumed that others, if not legally prevented, 
can easily imitate new knowledge at little or no cost. Thus, under perfect 
competition conditions, there would be no incentive on the part of private 
agents to invest in the creation of new productive knowledge. As a result, 
IP rights can be taken as a second best solution to a failure in the markets 
for knowledge and information. Moreover, it is quite a common opinion that 
setting up a very tight IP rights regime could reduce the information spillo-
ver from the original discoverer to possible users by preventing people from 
having access to crucial technical information.
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To escape these drawbacks and as an alternative to traditional IP rights 
protection, developing countries may opt to protect inventions by util-
ity models23 and industrial designs. Nowadays, only a small but significant 
number of countries provide the option of utility model protection, but in 
the past this weaker form of IP rights protection represented the backbone 
of the IP system of almost all the actual industrial economies. The condi-
tions for the registration of utility models are usually less stringent than tra-
ditional IP rights since no inventive steps or only a less significant inventive 
step is required. Moreover, because novelty and inventive step are usually 
not examined prior to registration, the procedure for registration is faster 
and acquisition and maintenance fees are generally lower than those appli-
cable to patents. Utility models are considered particularly suited for those 
innovations that make «minor» improvements to existing products. More 
specifically, a utility model is an exclusive right granted for an invention, 
which allows the right holder to prevent others from commercially using the 
protected invention without his authorization, for a limited period of time. 
In its basic definition, which may vary from one country (where such pro-
tection is available) to another, a utility model is similar to a patent. The 
main differences are:
The requirements for acquiring a utility model are less stringent than for 
patents, in the sense that, in contrast to patents, the size of the «inventive
step» or «non-obviousness» may be much lower or absent altogether. In prac-
tice, protection for utility models is often sought for innovations of a rather 
incremental character which may not meet the patentability criteria;
The term of protection for utility models is shorter than for patents and 
varies from country to country (usually between 7 and 10 years without the 
possibility of extension or renewal);
Patent offices do not examine applications as to substance prior to reg-
istration, with the result that the process of registration is often significantly 
simpler and faster, taking, on average, six months;
In some countries, utility model protection can only be obtained for cer-
tain fields of technology and only for products but not for processes.
All these differences can move in favour of a more competitive environ-
ment, since, unlike patents, utility models can raise the costs of imitation 
without materially delaying competing product introduction. For instance, 
as Kumar (2002) explains, in East Asia a combination of relatively weak IP 
rights protection and the availability of second-tier IP rights like utility mod-
els has encouraged technological learning through a high degree of market 
competition.
23 In the literature the Utility Models are also known as «petty patents» or «utility inno-
vations».
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Prizesandprocurementcontracts
If the innovation’s expected value is known ex-ante, the government can 
screen the project itself and other incentive mechanisms, such as prizes and 
procurements, can replace IP rights in promoting local R&D. The reason 
why they may be preferred is that they avoid deadweight loss without incur-
ring in a fall in the R&D effort provision.
If there is a single firm qualified for carrying out the research program 
(i.e., the cost of the innovation is freely observable ex-ante), a prize is the 
optimal incentive mechanism. Technically, the prize consists of a fixed pay-
ment financed out of public resources conditional on delivering a specific in-
vention. The amount of the prize can be adapted individually to firms but 
in general it is set equal to the social value of the invention. This makes the 
objective function of the firm equal to that of society and aligns the private 
interests of the firm with those of the community.
Examples of how this incentive scheme can be extended to cases in 
which the value of the invention is unverifiable ex-ante are provided by Kre-
mer (1998) and DeLaat (1996), where the incentive schemes proposed are 
hybrid mechanisms combining IP rights and prizes.
For more complicated research sectors in which more than one firm is 
qualified for the research program (i.e., the cost of the innovation turns out 
to be the firms’ private information), prizes, as well as IP rights, fail to be the 
best incentive schemes. In such a situation, the government knows that the 
social value of the project exceeds its production costs but it does not know 
which firms are the most cost-efficient among all the competitors. A problem 
of optimal delegation then arises, concerning how to pick up the more effi-
cient firms and motivate them to invest at efficient rates. If the market had 
room for just one firm, then there would be no reason to suppose that the 
lower cost firm will be the entrant when the relative efficiency of the firm is 
not observable and prizes would again be the best incentive mechanism. But 
when the market has room for more than one firm, then procurement con-
tracts perform better than prizes in efficiently delegating the right to invent.
A procurement contract is a mechanism through which the government 
is allowed to acquire an invention at minimum cost. It was first introduced 
by Laffont - Tirole (1986, 1987) and consists of an auction for the right to 
be paid when the invention is delivered as well as a fixed-price contract. The 
idea of the contract is to pay costs as they accrue in such a way as to make 
future grants contingent on previous research success. Fixed-price contracts 
then look like prizes with the peculiarity that researchers must convince the 
government in advance that their research results are worthy of a prize. In 
general, the procurement contracts would typically not be offered to all can-
didates. A preliminary negotiation phase is needed so that the government 
can sort out which firms are more efficient and deserving of the prize.
According to Gandal - Scotchmer (1993) though, there are many research 
fields in which even an auction would not ensure that only the most efficient 
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firms invest. As a remedy, they propose an incentive scheme in which the 
government should offer a menu of options with both fixed fees and firm-
specific prizes. The aim of such a policy is twofold. On the one hand, it en-
courages firms to reveal their truly efficiencies. On the other, it encourages 
firms to invest as efficiently as possible.
5.2. ProvidingBasicResearch
Basic research is a fundamental ingredient for applied, business-orientated 
research. Many countries have tried to encourage basic research either directly 
through public R&D or indirectly through incentives to firms. Clear examples 
of direct government R&D are university financing, government research in-
stitutes, science parks and research-orientated graduate schools. Indirect R&D 
includes preferential finance, tax concessions, matching grants, commercializa-
tion and the promotion of national R&D projects. Developing countries, in 
fact, cannot take advantage of a vast stock of knowledge unless they develop 
the competence to adapt it to their domestic needs. In many cases knowl-
edge produced elsewhere must be adapted to local conditions and consum-
ers’ tastes and the availability of basic knowledge is crucial in order to lay the 
foundationsfor developing an efficient national innovation system.
In general, the target of basic research may differ according to which 
policy instrument is used by the government. Two instruments are typically 
used:
– Public (government or university) performed research;
– Economic incentives for private (non-government) research institutes.
As is well known, basic research is mainly driven by scientists’ curiosity
or a particular interest in a scientific question. The main motivation is to ex-
pandman’s knowledge, not to create or invent something. As a result, there 
is no obvious commercial value to the discoveries that result from basic re-
search, so that it is carried out in public laboratories or universities and is 
funded essentially by government.
But even in the case that there is a clear value in various types of sci-
entific research, it is likely that private firms will prefer those industries in 
which the wedge between private and social returns is likely to be highest. 
Thus, basic research in non-business areas (such as defence) would be un-
derprovided in the presence of a pure private R&D system, with the result 
of a significant loss of technology spillover on society for business applica-
tions. Classic examples of positive spillover from basic to applied research 
are the Internet and later the Web browsers, which were both conceived and 
developed with government expenditure for non-business R&D and are now 
providing an entirely new realm of business opportunities. In this respect, 
Stern - Porter - Furman (2001) find that those OECD countries which have 
located a higher share of their R&D performance in the educational sector 
have been able to achieve more efficient national innovation systems.
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The second policy instrument is the indirect support of research per-
formed by non-government research institutes. Following the Frascati Man-
ual, developing countries can account for two categories of government 
funding: (1) grants or subsidies; and (2) fiscal incentives. In both cases, pub-
lic resources are targeted to specific goals chosen by the government. For in-
stance, they might found research projects that have a potentially high social 
return (e.g. «generic technologies» or «pre-competitive research») or that are 
useful to the government’s own specific objectives (e.g. health, defence). If 
these policies are effective, public and private funding may be complemen-
tary and increasing the former will enhance the latter.
However, each of these economic incentives has its own shortcomings. 
In using R&D subsidies, governments must take into account that they may 
crowd out private spending by increasing the demand for R&D and hence 
its price. As David - Hall (2000) argue, the major effect of government fund-
ing is to raise the wage of researchers, so, when faced with higher research 
costs, firms will shift their funding to alternative investments. This implies 
that, even if the total amount of R&D is higher as a result of government 
funding, the real amount of R&D will be lower. Moreover, even though gov-
ernment subsidies to R&D are much better than other incentive mechanisms 
in terms of monopoly distortions, there remains the asymmetric information 
problem and the risk of inefficient subsidization. An inefficient public policy 
may generate distortions in the allocation of resources between fields of re-
search and it may also distort competition between firms by supporting some 
at the expense of others. As regards fiscal incentives, they do not make the 
government discriminate much, implying that firms can use public money for 
any goal, whatever its social rate of return. In addition, tax incentives also 
have some discriminatory features, as they are not accessible to firms that are 
not taxable, e.g. new firms with investment higher than sales, no profit in-
stitutions, and so forth. Such companies may be among the most innovative 
and may also be the most in need of funds.
6. Final Remarks
In this paper we addressed the question of technology transfer from a 
policy standpoint. In doing so, we recognized a knowledge gap as the main 
source of cross-countries productivity disparity. What emerged from the pa-
per is that a successful trade liberalization (both in terms of lower trade bar-
riers and less FDI impediments) ought to be part of a broader set of policy-
measures including competition and industrial policies, and education.
We also stressed that IP rights are more effective in attracting knowledge 
in the absence of private information, while other incentive schemes, such as 
prizes and procurement contracts, appear to be more appropriate for more 
complicated industrial environments.
Stimulating information transmission turns out to be fundamental also 
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for the creation of an indigenous R&D. Governments can pursue this goal 
by both creating the right incentive scheme and by developing an efficient 
and autonomous public-founded R&D system. But after a country succeeds 
in building local R&D, the next goal of the government must be an indus-
trial policy aimed at protecting the most technologically active firms and in-
dustries from external misappropriation and at enhancing international col-
laboration. In such cases, an industrial policy aimed at protecting the most 
technologically active firms and industries must pay attention to MNEs’ ac-
quisition strategies as well as their merger activities, especially when organ-
izational issues could lead MNEs’ management to generate positive knowl-
edge spillovers.
The recent development of India and China seem to confirm our analy-
sis. In the case of India, its brilliant growth performance has mainly been the 
result of a human capital-based acquisition policy aimed at attracting inward 
FDI in some value added industries such as IT, chemical and pharmaceuti-
cal. Together with the success of many economic reforms, this has resulted 
in rapid export growth in skill-intensive manufacturing sectors such as ap-
parel and textiles, automotive components, and electronics assembly, which 
includes hi-tech areas such as information technology and biotechnology.
For China, on the other hand, things are different and reflect in part the 
country’s ability to attract inward FDI through a low production cost policy 
for manufacturing and, in part, the capability of its workforce to reverse en-
gineer low value-added imported-products.
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Summary: International Technology Gap and Technology Transmission: The Policy Implications 
(J.e.l. F, K2, O2, O3)
Income per capita differences have increased dramatically over the last fifty years. Many economists 
seem to recognize knowledge differences as the main factor in this worldwide economic performance di-
vergence. Developing countries suffer significantly from lagging labour productivity and managerial ef-
ficiency related in part to the failure to adopt the latest technology or to update their labour force, and 
such an evidence has recently led to a huge debate about which channel is most effective in stimulating 
technology transfer and acquisition. In this paper we will review the policy tools that have been effective 
in reducing the international knowledge-gap between Developed and Developing countries, and the role 
played by institutional factors in accomplishing such an issue.

